Pittsburgh CorningPittsburgh Corning is a joint venture between the Corning Glass Works and Pittsburgh
Plate Glass (which changed its name in 1968 to PPG Industries) each parent company
holds 50% of the stock in the offspring. Prior to 1962 Pittsburgh Corning had two main
products glass block (used in walls and decorative facades) and
foamglass.
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The Case Against Pittsburgh CorningFoamglass is used as a low-temperature insulating material and is especially used as an insulator for refrigeration equipment. The traditional material for this kind of work was vegetable cork, i.e., the stuff that gets stuck in wine bottles. During the Second World War, Pittsburgh Corning (hereinafter "PC") had a bonanza because Portugal is the world's major source of cork. It was difficult, to say the least, to bring cork from Portugal across the Atlantic, what with U-boats and all. So the Federal Government had Pittsburgh Corning churn out great quantities of foamglass, which is still used for low-temperature (up to a couple of hundred degrees) and refrigeration insulation. While foamglass does not contain asbestos, it plays a role in the story because of the precautions PC took to prevent its workers from getting silicosis, which, as a glass company, they were very sensitive to.
In 1961, in order to enter the high-temperature insulation
market, PC began to look into purchasing the Unibestos product line from Unarco. Unibestos
was a unique type of industrial thermal pipe insulation it is composed mostly (at
least 60%) of amosite asbestos fiber, and little else. As part of their investigation they
got in touch with Cape Asbestos in the UK, in order to see about the supply of raw amosite
fiber. In 1961, Richard Gaze, chief scientist for Cape Asbestos in England, met with the
top management of PC in Pittsburgh to advise them on the whole matter. Gaze was in
Pittsburgh meeting with the management of North American Asbestos, a wholly owned
subsidiary of Cape, which sold Cape's raw fiber in the US and Canada. Gaze met with the
President of PC, Russell Brittingham (now deceased) and others, and told them about the
manufacturing process. Gaze was knowledgeable about this because another subsidiary of
Cape, called Cape Insulation, made a similar product with the trade name "Caposite" at a
plant in Barking, England. Gaze also warned them about the hazards of asbestos. Gaze had
known about asbestos and disease since he started working with Cape in 1943. He was fully
aware of asbestos and mesothelioma at the time he met with the PC people. The next step
was that PC sent a delegation to a pipecovering plant in Canada owned by an outfit called
Holmes Foundry that used Cape's amosite fiber. Shortly after that, Brittingham wrote to
Gaze and asked if he could come to London to learn more. When he did come to London, Gaze
showed him around the Barking Plant. PC then sent a delegation to look at the Barking
Plant and get more technical know-how, which is what they were primarily interested in. It
was at that point that they put the ink on the supply contract. Gaze continued to travel
to Pittsburgh to meet with PC management every year until 1971 and on all these occasions
he discussed the hazards of asbestos.
Pittsburgh Corning purchased the Unibestos product line from
Unarco on May 5, 1962. This included the operating plant in Tyler, Texas, and a plant in
Illinois that was dismantled. PC had a manufacturing facility at Port Allegany, in Western
Pennsylvania, that was already making foamglass and glass block. A building was added and
the equipment from the Unarco Plant in Illinois was set up there.
Unibestos pipecovering is manufactured in the following
fashion: the amosite asbestos bag is slit open and the contents are dumped into a machine
that "fluffs" the fiber, separating all the clumps and bundles of fiber so that the
resultant material is, well, fluffy. The asbestos is dry-mixed with other dry ingredients,
such as diatomaceous earth, and a machine spreads the mixture out evenly on a conveyor
belt. As it went down the conveyor belt, it was sprayed by overhead nozzles with liquid
sodium silicate, the binder that holds everything together. As it went further down the
line it was rolled up on a mandrel. A mandrel is a cylindrical male mold that functions
somewhat akin to a rolling pin. After the material was rolled up on the mandrel to the
desired thickness the mandrel was removed and the piece now a hollow tube a little
longer than three feet went onto another conveyor through an oven for drying. Once
dry, the ends of the product were trimmed off with a bandsaw and then the tube was sawed
down the middle to make two halves for pipecovering.
The general supervisor of the Unibestos operation, from its
inception, was Bernard Ryan. He had the research department at PC pull medical articles
for him in 1962-63 regarding hazards of the ingredients that would be going into
Unibestos, including, of course, asbestos. These included Dr. Wagner's mesothelioma
article, published in 1960. He compiled notes on these articles, but did not show the
notes to anyone else at PC. Included was a notation made from Wagner's 1963 article on
asbestosis in experimental animals, to the effect that amosite asbestos fiber was worse
than chrysotile.
The PC "party line" used to be that their first awareness of
asbestos health hazards was through their marketing guy, Roy Fuhs, who is now deceased. He
testified at a deposition in 1978 and at a trial for PC in 1983, to the effect that the
idea for the warnings came from Fuhs being in a warehouse in Mississippi in 1968 and
seeing the warning label on a box of Owens-Corning Kaylo. He communicated to his superiors
that it might be a good idea to label boxes of Unibestos in the same manner, which was
apparently done at the end of 1968. In fact, PC put warnings on Unibestos because they
were being sued.
The three witnesses who kill PC are Lee Grant, M.D., Morton
Corn, Ph.D., and Ron Francis. Lee Grant is sort of a pathetic figure. He went into the Air
Force after his medical training, doing a subspecialty of industrial medicine. By 1964, he
was a full colonel and assistant to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. He retired that
year and moved to the Pittsburgh area, where he was approached, unsolicited, by Pittsburgh
Plate Glass to be their Medical Director. This was a newly created position at PPG. In
October of 1964, he was approached by Byrl Stout, who had become head of manufacturing at
PC that year. According to Grant, Stout came with another official from PC into Grant's
Office at PPG. Stout had a copy of a 1964 newspaper article headlined "a rare carcinoma on
the rise." Stout asked Grant what he knew about mesothelioma. A detailed memo by Grant of
this meeting, along with a copy of the article, still exists. Dr. Grant first visited the
Tyler, Texas plant in November of 1965. He had available to him an industrial hygiene
survey that was done in 1963. He had also reviewed the medical literature to some extent.
The bottom line was that nobody did anything about the health situation at Tyler, in spite
of Dr. Grant's repeated involvement. He never pushed hard to do anything, and was
understandably very defensive on this point at the time his deposition was taken in the
1970's.
What was bugging Dr. Grant can be found in the deposition of
Morton Corn, Ph.D. He was an industrial hygiene engineer who was retained by PC at the
direction of Dr. Grant in 1966, when both he and Grant visited the Port Allegany plant.
Corn subsequently designed dust control systems for both Port Allegany and Tyler. The Port
Allegany system was installed in the summer of 1970, with modifications insisted on by PC,
over Corn's objections, that greatly diminished the effectiveness of the system. The Tyler
system was never installed. Corn also supervised the shutdown and cleanup of the Tyler
plant in 1972-73.
In 1973, Paul Brodeur (who later wrote a book, "Outrageous
Misconduct" about the asbestos industry) wrote a series of "Annals of Industry" articles
for the New Yorker magazine. This then became a book entitled "Expendable America" which
won a reporting prize. The focus of the articles and subsequent book was on PC's conduct
in connection with the Tyler, Texas plant. Brodeur had come down like ton of bricks on Dr.
Grant, for abdicating his responsibilities as a physician and looking out for his employer
rather than the workers. Grant was devastated by this article, and thought that he had
been treated unfairly. Corn is more sympathetic to Grant, but also testifies that book is
essentially an accurate recitation of what happened. Grant then attempted to take an
extraordinary step to clear his name. He wanted to have what is known as a "peer review"
with the American Academy of Occupational Medicine, where other occupational/industrial
physicians would examine all of the available facts and pass judgment on his conduct. He
gathered all of his files together, prepared a written statement, consulted with Dr. Corn,
and called a meeting with the PPG management at PPG headquarters on December 18, 1973. The
meeting, which Corn attended, was a humiliating embarrassment for Dr. Grant. The PPG house
counsel basically told Grant to forget about the peer review, because it would make others
at PC and PPG look bad. All of the top management people were there, and it was clear that
they had all met before he and Corn got there. No one else, including Grant, got to say a
word, and the meeting was over in ten or fifteen minutes.
Ron Francis was promoted to the title of assistant works
manager of the Port Allegany plant (not just the Unibestos part of it, which was known as
"Plant 8") in June of 1964. In the late summer or early fall of 1965, he met Richard Gaze
when Gaze was on one of his visits to Port Allegany. Gaze told Byrl Stout at that time
that the asbestos dust levels were too high. In response Larry Griffith, the head guy at
Port Allegany and Francis' immediate supervisor sent Francis and Robert Stohr, head of
quality control, on a three-day trip to England to see how dust control was done at the
Cape Plants. Stohr was going to compare the quality of the finished Cape products with
those of the PC products. When Francis got to the airport in London, he picked up a
newspaper (the Sunday Times) that had the headline "Scientists track down killer dust
disease." He read the article and brought the paper to the Cape plant with him. There he
met with a Dr. Harding, the plant doctor, who told Mr. Francis all about asbestosis, lung
cancer and mesothelioma. He was able to observe the dust removal system at the Cape plant,
which was vastly superior to anything he had ever seen. For example, all of the dust
creating processes were done by machines, rather than workers, and those machines were in
hermetically sealed housings that were totally dustproof. If they needed to be opened and
serviced, the personnel doing that wore respirators.
He photographed the equipment, and flew back to the US. On his
flight back, he wrote a detailed report to his superior, Mr. Griffith. That report has
vanished. When he got back, he started always to wear a respirator in plant 8. He met with
the president of the company, who told him that his fancy dust equipment was too expensive
and Unibestos was not profitable enough to justify the outlay. Francis continued to
agitate, and in 1966 he did not get a bonus, in spite of everyone else at Port Allegany
getting one. He felt totally isolated at this point, so he left the company in April of
1966.
Pittsburgh Corning is notable for at least two reasons: first,
they made what was probably the most lethal construction product ever put on the market,
Unibestos pipe insulation; second, they entered the asbestos thermal insulation market
after many of the health hazards of asbestos had become irrefutably known throughout the
thermal insulation industry.
The Pittsburgh Corning
Bankruptcy
Pittsburgh Corning filed for bankruptcy in the
year 2000, taking itself out of the tort system. There may be a couple of hundred million
dollars that will at least theoretically be available to compensate sufferers of
mesothelioma, lung cancer, and asbestosis who have been exposed to Pittsburgh Corning's
Unibestos pipecovering.
Unibestos was one of the few high-temperature thermal pipe
insulations that could be applied to pipes made from stainless steel (ordinary calcium
silicates cause stainless steel to corrode). It was, therefore, used heavily in
applications like nuclear submarines (the reactors have pipes made of stainless steel),
chemical plants, and refineries. As it is composed primarily of amosite asbestos,
Unibestos was one of the more lethal products to hit the pipe insulation market,
especially when it comes to causing mesothelioma.
Those who will be most affected are workers whose primary
exposure was to Unibestos, and those who have difficulty proving exposure to the
asbestos-containing products of other manufacturers which are not, as of yet, in
bankruptcy.
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